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It is no secret that advertising’s main goal is to cause people to spend more 
money. And it works. One study found that “59% of new-product advertising 
tests showed a positive impact on sales . . . . When a particular advertising weight 
or copy is effective, it works relatively rapidly. Incremental sales begin to occur 
within six months.”1 Research shows that the effect on sales lasts—
advertisements have both short and long-term positive correlations with sales.2 
As just one example, various studies have shown that children exposed to food 
advertising are much more likely to pick the advertised brands and are more 
likely to try to influence their parents’ shopping.3 In short, advertising effectively 
exploits us. 
This article argues that this exploitation should not be a one-way street. 
Policymakers and researchers can use advertising to detect ways in which 
consumers systematically make bad decisions in specific markets. In other words, 
we can exploit advertising. 
In an economic model that assumes consumers are perfectly rational and have 
perfect information, advertising is superfluous, so it does not have the potential 
to exploit us, and researchers cannot learn from it. If all buyers know everything 
about existing products and make decisions that maximize their utility, then 
advertising cannot influence purchasing decisions, either by providing 
information or using persuasion to differentiate competing products.4 
But we do not live in that kind of a world. Economists have long conceded 
that most consumer markets are characterized by imperfect information.5 More 
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recently, research in the field of behavioral economics has seriously undermined 
the notion that people are rational actors with stable preferences.6 
In the real world, where people often make irrational decisions based on 
imperfect information, advertising serves two purposes: (1) to provide factual 
information to help consumers in the search for products and (2) to persuade 
consumers to purchase products.7 The first of these functions—providing 
information—is consistent with the classical economic model of human 
decisionmaking. Under traditional economic theory, consumers are rational 
actors working to maximize their own utility.8 Advertising that provides 
information lowers the search costs that consumers face in finding the best 
products and services.9 
Many examples of the persuasive function of advertising, and some instances 
of informative advertising, however, cannot be explained through classical 
economic theory. Instead, they are consistent with behavioral economics. 
Behavioral economics relaxes some of the assumptions of classical economics by 
acknowledging that consumers have malleable (as opposed to stable) preferences 
and that consumers make systematic mistakes, especially when they evaluate 
probabilities.10 Notably, behavioral economics recognizes that advertising has the 
ability and indeed the intent to change consumers’ preferences,11 and much of 
advertising’s attempt to persuade consumers involves changing preferences and 
playing on miscalculations in probabilities.12 
If consumers make systematic, predictable mistakes in evaluating products 
and services, the market is not functioning efficiently. Market failure occurs 
under a variety of conditions, including where consumers possess imperfect 
 
HARV. L. REV. 661, 663 (1977) (“Of course, even in theory consumers will never have perfect 
information. There are too many sellers offering too many products with a wide variety of characteristics 
changing over time, and in any event the self-serving source of the data will inevitably render the 
information somewhat inaccurate.”); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the 
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 630 (1979) (“It 
is generally recognized, however, that information is never perfect . . . .”). 
 6.  For two recent popular descriptions of the research on behavioral economics, see generally 
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING: FAST AND SLOW (2011); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
 7.  See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 661–63 (1985) 
(suggesting that advertising can affect buyers both by changing their factual beliefs and affecting their 
likes or dislikes in ways other than affecting beliefs). 
 8.  GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 153 (1976). 
 9.  Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: 
A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992). 
 10.  Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future, in 
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 3 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974).  
 11.  See Dan Ariely et al., “Coherent Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand Curves without Stable 
Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73, 103 (2003) (explaining that consumer preferences are subject to 
“deliberate manipulation”). 
 12.  See generally Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1701, 1724 (Mark Armstrong & Rob Porter eds., 2007).  
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information about the attributes of products and services.13 But markets can also 
fail if people make bad decisions because they mispredict their own use of a 
product or service, or because they do not recognize the importance of an 
attribute. This particular type of breakdown is called a behavioral market 
failure.14 
To date, the legal literature on advertising recognizes that advertising has the 
potential to exploit consumers’ behavioral biases.15 Commentary also suggests 
that manipulative advertising is a justification for policymakers to regulate 
specific markets.16 Beyond these minor steps, however, legal academic work on 
advertising has not made much use either theoretically or empirically of the vast 
amount of advertising in American life.17 
This article makes the novel suggestion that legal researchers and 
policymakers should use advertising to diagnose behavioral market failures and 
then enact or adjust legislation to address those failures. It argues that 
advertisements reflect companies’ beliefs about how consumers make purchasing 
decisions. If advertising supplies information that a rational actor would value, 
then there is good evidence that the market is not experiencing a behavioral 
market failure. If, on the other hand, advertising only serves to exploit the 
systematic mistakes that consumers make in the market, then it is likely that the 
market is not functioning efficiently. As economists Xavier Gabaix and David 
Laibson argue, “[o]ptimizing firms exploit myopic consumers through marketing 
schemes that shroud high-priced add-ons,” for example.18 By evaluating 
advertising in a market, we can diagnose—and perhaps correct—behavioral 
market failure. 
Part II explains this proposal in greater detail. After briefly reviewing the 
literature on behavioral economics and advertising, it details the mechanics of 
how academics can use advertising to detect firms’ attempts to exploit behavioral 
biases. It also makes several arguments for why using advertisements is an 
effective approach to uncovering market failures. Part III deals with 
 
 13.  Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE 
L.J. 1537, 1573 (1983). 
 14.  OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS 2 (2012). 
 15.  See infra Part II.A.  
 16.  See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 7, at 666 (“Restrictions on irrational sales techniques might seem 
perfectly consistent with the view of individuals as rational decisionmakers, because an irrational 
decision, almost by definition, could not advance the underlying preferences of a rational individual. . . . 
Correcting insufficiently deliberative decisions might then be seen as a neutral sort of intervention that 
did not require any controversial choice among conflicting values. While some value judgment is still 
involved in preferring conscious deliberation over other forms of decisionmaking, that preference is 
probably widely shared.”). 
 17.  Cf. Sarah C. Haan, The “Persuasion Route” of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2000) (“Changes in both the volume and style of commercial messages in recent 
decades—and the implications of those changes for various aspects of law—have gone largely unexplored 
in legal academia.”). 
 18.  Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 505 (2006). 
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counterarguments and limitations to this article’s proposal. Part IV uses the 
reverse mortgage market as a case study to apply the proposed approach. 
Drawing on recent empirical studies of reverse mortgage advertising, part IV 
shows how the rational-choice theory that flows from classical economics fails to 
explain some features of the advertising. By exploiting the advertisements for 
reverse mortgages, policymakers can detect places reverse mortgage customers 
are likely making systematically poor decisions. 
II 
THE THEORY AND MECHANICS BEHIND USING ADVERTISING TO DIAGNOSE 
BEHAVIORAL MARKET FAILURE 
Rational-choice economic theory views advertising differently from 
behavioral economic theory. In a rational-choice model, advertising can promote 
efficiency by informing the consumer about the product’s attributes and prices as 
well as alternatives to the product.19 It can also help consumers know their 
preferences and more accurately estimate the utility they can derive from a 
product.20 Advertising, in this view, does not shift the demand curve for a product. 
Instead, it rotates the curve because it allows for personal matches between 
consumers and products.21 
In contrast, behavioral economists argue that humans make systematic 
mistakes when evaluating products and predicting their own uses of products.22 
Advertising can take advantage of these mistakes by causing people to 
underestimate the cost or overestimate the value of the product. The result is that 
advertising causes the demand curve to shift,23 as depicted:24 
 
 
 19.  Karl-Erik Warneryd, Advertising and Consumer Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 94 (Benjamin Gilad & Stanley Kaish eds., 1986); see also JERRY KIRKPATRICK, IN 
DEFENSE OF ADVERTISING: ARGUMENTS FROM REASON, ETHICAL EGOISM, AND LAISSEZ-FAIRE 
CAPITALISM 22 (2007) (“As an institution in the division of labor and an instrument of capitalistic 
production, advertising communicates to many people at one time the availability and nature of need- 
and want-satisfying products.”). 
 20.  Warneryd, supra note 19, at 94. 
 21.  Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing and 
Product Design, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 756, 757 (2006) (“Real information . . . allows a consumer to learn 
of his personal match with the product’s characteristics; as we show, it rotates the demand curve. 
Importantly, supplying real information may sometimes lower, rather than raise, sales (and profits). Our 
taxonomy incorporates this possibility, distinguishing it from nearly all previous work on advertising.”). 
 22.  Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 10, at 1124. 
 23.  Cf. id. at 757 (“Promotional hype corresponds to the traditional notions of informative and 
persuasive advertising. It highlights the existence of the product, promotes any feature that is 
unambiguously valuable, or otherwise increases the willingness to pay of all consumers; it shifts the 
demand curve outward.”). 
 24.  Two Approaches to Market Equilibrium, SPARKNOTES, http://img.sparknotes.com/figures 
/0/039bab1e6f1ef2a65b5f4c8ddc66073a/beanie.gif [https://perma.cc/99GM-WDG2] (last visited Feb. 4, 
2017) (depicting demand curve shift).  
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The consumers’ pre-advertising demand causes them to be willing to pay P1. 
But advertising increases demand, increasing the consumers’ willingness to pay 
to P2. In this behavioral economic model, D1 represents the consumers’ true 
preferences, and D2 is the consumers’ preference that advertising has distorted.25 
This part presents the basic contours of the opportunity advertising offers to 
diagnose behavioral market failures and provides reasons for adopting this 
strategy. Subpart A briefly reviews the economic and advertising literature that 
relies on behavioral psychology, subpart B then outlines the mechanics. Finally, 
subpart C demonstrates the importance of advertising in general and its unique 
applicability to diagnosing behavioral market failure. 
A. Limited Literature Review 
Academic treatments of advertising have used behavioral economics in a 
variety of contexts. Economists discussing advertising use behavioral economics 
as a way to understand advertising better by including more realistic assumptions 
in the models.26 Legal and business scholars also draw on its insights to make 
 
 25.  Informative view scholars argue that the post advertising preferences are the relevant 
benchmark to judge true preferences. See Bagwell, supra note 12, at 1724 (“As Braithwaite argues, 
advertising may change tastes and distort consumption quantities. This results in a loss in consumer 
surplus relative to the pre-advertising benchmark. Informative view advocates counter that much 
advertising is informative, either directly or indirectly, and there is no taste-changing consumption 
distortion.”). However, this demand shift is distinct from merely the shift caused by persuasive 
advertising because the behavioral shift exploits mistakes to shift demand. Thus, it is not susceptible to 
the criticism by economists who claim the post-advertising demand is the true preference. 
 26.  See Bagwell, supra note 12, at 1825 (“First, over the past two decades, behavioral decision 
research in psychology has contributed to the field of behavioral economics. Work in this field is 
motivated by the desire to increase the psychological realism of economic models by imposing 
assumptions that are rooted in psychological regularity. Thus, preference functions or associated 
behavioral rules that have experimental support are embedded in theoretical models, in order to achieve 
new theoretical insights and better predictions.”); Lauren G. Block, Assessing the Impact of Antidrug 
Advertising on Adolescent Drug Consumption: Results From a Behavioral Economic Model, 92 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 1346, 1346 (2002) (using a behavioral economic model to measure the effect of 
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arguments against disclosures to correct advertising concerns.27 The existing 
literature commonly uses behavioral economic principles to criticize specific 
advertisements or industries.28 
None of these lines of scholarship, however, suggest learning about 
behavioral biases or behavioral market failures from the advertising itself. For 
example, economist Karl-Erik Warneryd suggests that behavioral science can 
contribute to economic research on advertising by offering an enriched 
conception of rationality, new perspectives on established economic debates 
about advertising (like its effects on pricing and demand levels), and new 
methods of assessing noneconomic factors in advertising that economists 
traditionally could not measure.29 He does not consider the reverse, however—
the ways advertising can contribute to behavioral science. Warneryd further 
recounts how past work suggests that behavioral science can offer insight into 
how the content of advertising affects consumers.30 This article argues that we can 
reverse this process and learn valuable information about consumers’ cognitive 
biases by analyzing the content of advertising. 
Several important works serve as precursors to this proposal. Professors Jon 
Hanson and Douglas Kysar, in one of the first discussions of behavioral 
economics and advertising in legal articles, introduce the notion that behavioral 
exploitation can be endogenous.31 Whereas prior work on behavioral law and 
economics had assumed that consumers’ cognitive defects were fixed and 
uninfluenced by firms operating in the market, Hanson and Kysar suggest that 
firms engage in “market manipulation” by altering consumers’ risk perceptions 
through advertising.32 Hanson and Kysar’s work opens the door to the suggestion 
that advertising can reveal behavioral biases because their work recognizes the 
 
advertising). 
 27.  See, e.g., Ho-Young Ahn et al., Consumers’ Optimism Bias and Responses to Risk Disclosures in 
Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) Prescription Drug Advertising: The Moderating Role of Subjective Health 
Literacy, 48 J.  CONSUMER AFF. 175, 178 (2014) (investigating “whether the degree of optimistic bias 
affected consumers’ risk disclosure processing in terms of their attention to risk disclosures, their 
perceived importance of risk disclosures, and their intentions to seek more risk information through 
alternative sources.”); Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1994) (examining “numerous information processing and decisionmaking 
problems that reduce the efficacy of any legally-mandated disclosure requirement.”). 
 28.  See, e.g., Ahmed E. Taha, Selling the Outlier, 41 J. CORP. L. 459, 461 (2015) (suggesting that 
advertising atypical results is problematic because people mistakenly take the atypical results as 
representative of the product being advertised); see also Trenton G. Smith, 
The McDonald’s Equilibrium: Advertising, Empty Calories, and the Endogenous Determination of 
Dietary Preferences, 23 SOC. CHOICE WELFARE 383, 402–06 (2004) (suggesting the method that humans 
use to process information about food and criticizing advertisements for exploiting consumers on that 
basis). 
 29.  Warneryd, supra note 19, at 91. 
 30.  See id. at 96 (“What has been said so far indicates that content analysis of advertising can at best 
give only part of the story. The role of the consumer himself must also be elaborated if the effects of 
different types of advertising are to be properly understood.”). 
 31.  Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market 
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 636 (1999). 
 32.  Id. at 635–37. 
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effect that firms have in manipulating consumers’ biases. Hanson and Kysar’s 
work, however, does not detect behavioral market failure. Instead, it simply 
assumes such market failure always exists, or at least, it only uses examples of 
markets where behavioral biases are in operation.33 Some markets conform to 
the rational-actor model, so a mechanism for distinguishing between rational and 
irrational markets is needed.34 
Second, Ron Harris and Einat Albin extend Hanson and Kysar’s work by 
offering evidence that market manipulation exists in consumer credit markets.35 
Harris and Albin’s work moves closer to the approach this article suggests. They 
identify the need to distinguish “between a genuine preference to borrow more, 
even at the risk of default, and borrowing that results from biases and 
manipulation.”36 However, their goal is not to use advertising to diagnose 
behavioral market failure, but use it instead to justify policy changes.37 Indeed, 
their main argument is that evidence of market manipulation justifies rethinking 
bankruptcy policy.38 Despite this different emphasis, however, their work is 
extremely important to this article’s diagnostic suggestion because they provide 
evidence that creditors gain from manipulating borrowers through advertising.39 
This evidence is an essential step in justifying the use of advertisements to detect 
market failure.40 
A third important article by economists Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson 
demonstrates the conditions under which shrouding or hiding undesirable terms 
occurs to lure in myopic customers. In these conditions, firms will take no efforts 
to cut prices or educate customers about other companies’ hidden fees.41 This 
work is a prerequisite for this article’s analysis because it shows why firms shroud 
 
 33.  Id. at 637 (noting that “we will focus in this Article primarily on the field of products liability 
law”). 
 34.  For instance, the efficient markets hypothesis relies on the assumption that the stock market is 
full of informed traders with strong incentives to avoid errors. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, 
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 851–52 
(1992); David S. Law, Introduction: Positive Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
1, 6 (2006). 
 35.  See Ron Harris & Einat Albin, Bankruptcy Policy in Light of Manipulation in Credit Advertising, 
7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 431, 442 (2006) (“Through marketing techniques and especially 
advertising, lenders of credit take advantage of consumers using persuasion and manipulation.”). 
 36.  Id. at 448. 
 37.  See id. (suggesting that the only time we need to decide if advertising is manipulating consumers 
is when specific “intervention is aimed at consumer decision making and not when it is aimed at the 
manipulating act, the credit market, or the creditors”). 
 38.  See id. at 431–33 (“This Article argues that when credit suppliers market and advertise their 
credit products, they utilize and enhance consumers’ cognitive biases, particularly their optimism bias 
and their illusion of control . . . . This justifies a rethinking of bankruptcy policy and doctrine.”); id. at 442 
(“These insights can serve as a basis for discussion of the need for intervention and for a rethinking of 
bankruptcy policy.”); id. at 447 (“We believe that this manipulation should be taken into consideration 
by the legal system when it addresses bankruptcy policy.”); id. at 466 (describing the aim of the Article 
as “integrating the discussion of biases and manipulation into bankruptcy discourse”). 
 39.  Id. at 449–51. 
 40.  See infra notes 59–63. 
 41.  Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 18. 
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through marketing and why this shrouding persists even in competitive markets. 
This article, however, offers a low-cost, straightforward strategy for learning 
about shrouding through the advertisements.42 
This article relies most on Professor Oren Bar-Gill’s recent book Seduction 
by Contract. In this book, Bar-Gill uses “design features” of consumer contracts, 
using behavioral economics to explain “the forces responsible for these design 
features.”43 Bar-Gill’s method is to first determine if rational-choice theory 
explains the existence of specific contract features.44 If those explanations are 
deficient, he examines whether behavioral economic principles explain the 
existence of the features.45 Bar-Gill explains that products’ designs exploit 
behavioral biases, thus creating market failure: 
When consumers are imperfectly rational, sellers compete by designing pricing schemes 
that create an appearance of a lower price. The underlying problem is on the demand 
side of the market; imperfectly rational consumers generate biased demand. 
Competition forces sellers to cater to this biased demand. The result: A behavioral 
market failure. . . . This behavioral market failure is a direct extension of the imperfect 
information problem.46 
Bar-Gill recognizes on a very general level that companies can create biases 
through advertising47 and that they could correct biases or reveal true prices 
through advertising.48 But his empirical strategy is focused exclusively on product 
design, and those following his approach mirror that narrow strategy.49 Instead, 
this article argues that researchers should use advertising to perform the task of 
diagnosing behavioral market failure instead of relying solely on product design. 
B. The Mechanics Of Diagnosing Behavioral Market Failure Through 
Advertisements 
Diagnosing market failure through advertising preliminarily requires 
determining whether specific advertisements are informative or persuasive. In 
 
 42.  Gabaix and Laibson offer five empirical strategies to determine if firms in a market are 
shrouding aspects of the transaction, ranging from surveying customers to determining if some hidden 
aspects of the transaction are priced above market price. Id. at 528–29. My strategy is complementary to 
their strategies, and this part explains the reasons that I think it is a superior approach.  
 43.  BAR-GILL, supra note 14, at 1. 
 44.  Id. at 2. 
 45.  Id. at 2–3. 
 46.  Id. at 16. 
 47.  Id. at 16 (“[P]erceptions and misperceptions can be endogenous. In particular, sellers can 
influence consumer perceptions. That’s a big part of what marketing is about.”); id. at 32 (“[S]ellers might 
actually prefer not to correct consumer mistakes. They might even invest in creating misperception. This 
manipulation of consumer perceptions and preferences is, arguably, one of the main goals of 
advertising.”).  
 48.  Id. at 165 (“Competing sellers will often have an incentive to correct consumer mistakes. This 
can be done, for example, through advertising.”); id. at 91 (“[T]iming is not the only factor affecting the 
salience of a price or other contractual dimension. For example, advertising by issuers . . . can make a 
long-term price salient to consumers.”). 
 49.  Matthew A. Edwards, The Law, Marketing and Behavioral Economics of Consumer Rebates, 12 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 362, 375 (2007); Thomas S. Ulen, A Behavioral View of Investor Protection, 44 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1357, 1366–67 (2013). 
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the academic literature on advertising, scholars use content analysis to make this 
determination. Content analysis requires researchers to analyze the 
advertisement’s text and visual presentation. An advertisement is considered 
informative if it communicates information about the price, quality, and 
availability of a product or service.50 On the other hand, advertising is persuasive 
if, under the traditional definition, it aims to differentiate products even though 
the products are essentially the same. For instance, academics categorize 
advertisements aimed at creating brand loyalty based purely on the brand name 
as persuasive.51 Some economists have argued that the distinction between 
informative and persuasive advertising is artificial,52 but it has withstood the test 
of time and analytic scrutiny. For almost one hundred years, academic advertising 
research has employed, analyzed, and relied on the distinction. Thus, this article 
accepts it as valid for present purposes. 
Whether an advertisement is informative or merely persuasive is important 
for determining the value of the advertisement because, in economics, the social 
value of advertising depends on whether the advertising informs or merely 
persuades.53 Informative advertising drives down prices and matches consumers 
and products appropriately.54 It is a market response to the problem of imperfect 
information.55 In contrast, persuasive advertising “induces artificial product 
differentiation and results in concentrated markets characterized by high prices 
and profits.”56 If we deem an advertisement to be purely persuasive, then the 
likelihood that rational-choice economic models can explain its existence is much 
lower. 
Alan Resnik and Bruce Stern established the criteria for determining whether 
advertising is informative.57 Advertising is informative if it communicates: “1. 
Price or Value, 2. Quality, 3. Performance, 4. Components or Contents, 5. 
Availability, 6. Special Offers, 7. Taste, 8. Packaging or Shape, 9. Guarantees or 
Warrantees, 10. Safety, 11. Nutrition, 12. Independent Research, 13. Company-
Sponsored Research, 14. New Ideas.”58 
  
 
 50.  Alan Resnik & Bruce L. Stern, An Analysis of Information Content in Television Advertising, 41 
J. MARKETING 50, 50–51 (1977).  
 51.  Bagwell, supra note 12, at 1705–06. 
 52.  TERENCE H. QUALTER, ADVERTISING AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MASS AGE 91 (1991). 
 53.  Warneryd, supra note 19, at 90 (“While the former function may promote market transparency 
and can be taken to be part of the process of producing goods so they come within the reach of 
prospective buyers, the latter function may be seen as a disturbing factor creating monopolistic 
tendencies, that is, it accomplishes unilateral changes in power relations.”). 
 54.  Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer 
Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491, 492 (1981); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 5, at 645. 
 55.  Bagwell, supra note 12, at 1706 (“[A]dvertising is the endogenous response that the market 
offers as a solution. When a firm advertises, consumer receive at lost cost additional direct (prices, 
location) and/or indirect (the firm is willing to spend on advertising) information.”). 
 56.  Id. at 1705–06. 
 57.  Resnik & Stern, supra note 50, at 51. 
 58.  Id. 
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In using advertisements to assess behavioral market failure, performing the 
traditional economic content analysis of searching for informative content is the 
first step, because only informative advertisements have the potential to have a 
rational-choice explanation. Persuasive advertising is by definition not based on 
rational arguments, so it is unlikely to be explained by a rational-choice 
framework. 
But just because an advertisement contains information does not mean the 
information necessarily appeals to the concerns of a rational or myopic actor. 
After determining that an advertisement has informative content, one must 
decide whether the advertisement provides information that a rational actor 
would value. When presented in a straightforward manner, this information 
would typically be information about price, quality, and availability.59 But it could 
include a wide variety of information. Many advertisements fall squarely into this 
category. 
The advertisements that do not have a rational-choice explanation open the 
door to detecting behavioral market failure. Where rational-choice theory fails, 
behavioral economics might have powerful explanatory power for the existence 
of specific types of information in advertising. If the behavioral account explains 
the information based on systematic mistakes that consumers make in other 
contexts, then we are likely to uncover market failure. 
All of this assumes that firms actively work to use advertising to exploit 
consumers’ systematically poor decisionmaking when possible. If advertising is 
done without cognitive defects in mind, then this diagnostic approach fails before 
it begins. There is substantial evidence, however, that sophisticated firms are 
mindful of consumers’ deviations from the ideal rational actor.60 As Sarah Haan 
explains, “[A]dvertising researchers study human decisionmaking shortcuts . . . 
to create advertisements that steer consumers down particular routes to 
persuasion. By investing millions of dollars in follow-up quantitative research—
consumer surveys, focus groups, and retail sales information, much of which is 
never published—advertisers hone their appeals.”61 
There are many examples of firms consciously adopting a behaviorally 
informed advertising strategy. A recent advertising PhD dissertation discussing 
behavioral economics includes a section on how managers can use consumers’ 
biases for early product releases to increase sales.62 Philip De Meulemeester, a 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Haan, supra note 17, at 1323. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer 
Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 751, 761 (2008) (“If sellers choose to design their products in ways that 
respond to consumer misperception, then they must believe that misperception is systematic and 
robust . . . . Such product design is evidence that consumers make systematic mistakes (or, at least, that 
sellers believe that consumers are making systematic mistakes).”). 
 61.  Haan, supra note 17, at 1282. 
 62.  See ANNE LINE HOLCK OMLAND, THE FUTURE BIAS IN MARKETING: A LONGITUDINAL 
APPROACH 57 (June 2011) (unpublished Master Thesis, The Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration) http://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/169049/Omland%202011 
.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/UDT7-G4QP] (performing a variety of survey studies 
analyzing how people construe products over time through a behavioral lens and concluding that the 
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Planner at Saatchi & Saatchi London, has an entire presentation about 
behavioral economics and how to use advertising to capture the benefits of these 
advances in economics.63 Tronvig Group, a marketing company that serves 
museums and non-profits among other clients, suggests that clients develop 
marketing strategies specifically to exploit consumers’ optimism bias.64 In one 
personal example, after I wrote an article analyzing the dangers of behavioral 
biases in the rent-to-own industry several years ago,65 a rent-to-own trade 
publication published an article describing the findings so that rent-to-own 
companies could use those exact findings to increase sales.66 In light of the 
evidence from the advertising industry, it appears firms are both aware of 
consumers’ biases and willing to exploit them. 
C. Justifying Using Advertisements 
Bar-Gill suggests using product design to uncover behavioral biases,67 and 
Gabaix and Laibson offer five empirical strategies for uncovering instances of 
shrouding.68 So why turn to advertising to diagnose behavioral market failure? 
The  amount of money that companies spend on advertising alone demonstrates 
its economic importance. In 2003, General Motors spent $3.43 billion, Proctor 
and Gamble spent $3.32 billion, and Pfizer spent $2.84 billion on advertising.69 In 
2005, advertising represented 2.2% of the United States’ gross domestic 
product—$1,200 per citizen and a $272 billion total cost.70 
Beyond the enormous cost that firms expend on advertising, it is also the most 
obvious place to find firms exploiting irrational thinking. As Edward L. Glaeser 
observed, “We should expect to see a proliferation of misleading signals and 
other cues when incorrect beliefs are complements to buying sellers’ commodities 
or supporting politicians. The advertising industry is the most important 
economic example of these systematic attempts to mislead . . . .”71 The central 
 
“research has implications that are relevant for managers as it shows that consumer attitudes can be 
affected by advertising a product as available sometime in the future, as opposed to it being immediately 
available. The results from the study suggest that temporal framing can be used successfully as a 
marketing tool for improving consumers’ evaluations of products and to generate interest in the 
product.”). 
 63.  Philip De Meulemeester, Behavioural Economics in Advertising Planning, IN (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://www.slideshare.net/philipdemeulemeester/behavioural-economics-in [https://perma.cc/L45V-7N 
SC]. 
 64.  James Heaton, Optimism Bias in Marketing, TRONVIG GROUP, http://www.tronviggroup.com/ 
optimism-bias-in-marketing/ [https://perma.cc/HP9D-RWPE] (last visited Feb. 4, 2017). 
 65.  Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041 (2008). 
 66.  Ed Winn, Rent-to-Own and Behavioral Economics, PROGRESSIVE RENTALS 31, 34 (Oct.–Nov. 
2007) (suggesting that “some of the insights concerning individuals’ economic behavior may influence 
how dealers position and run their businesses”).  
 67.  Bar-Gill, supra note 60, at 752. 
 68.  Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 18, at 528. 
 69.  Bagwell, supra note 12, at 1704. 
 70.  Benedetto Molinari & Francesco Turino, Advertising and Aggregate Consumption: A Bayesian 
DSGE Assessment 2 (2015). 
 71.  Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. PAPERS & 
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purpose of advertising is to affect the demand curve either through persuasion or 
information, so it serves as a primary vehicle for companies to change consumers’ 
perception of the value of a product or service.72 
As a practical matter, using advertisements to detect market failure is also a 
lower cost alternative to other methods. Advertisements are designed to be seen, 
so accessing them is relatively easy, especially compared to surveying customers 
or other research methods.73 The tools of content analysis are well-established 
and easy to teach to people74 (in contrast to, for instance, performing econometric 
analysis75), so the method is available to researchers and policymakers with a 
variety of expertise levels. 
III 
POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS AND CRITICISMS 
There are of course limitations and criticisms to this proposed strategy. An 
entire body of literature argues against behavioral economics in general and 
against the very existence of systematic consumer mistakes.76 This article leaves 
those broader criticisms aside and focuses instead on anticipated criticisms to this 
specific proposal. 
One potential criticism is that advertising does not actually cause 
consumption of negative products. Seounmi Youn et al. argue, for instance, that 
“despite emerging efforts to censor advertising for controversial products, there 
is often little compelling evidence to suggest that advertising is a major factor in 
causing any of these problem behaviors or that a ban on advertising would result 
in reduced consumption.”77 Though this criticism may be a persuasive argument 
against regulating advertising, it is not a reason to reject using advertisements to 
diagnose behavioral market failures. Even if advertisements do not actually cause 
consumers to purchase products, firms must think the advertisements work 
because they spend vast amounts of money on them. Firms’ beliefs about 
behavioral biases can be used as the proxy for market failure, so it does not 
matter if advertisements are ineffective as long as research can demonstrate that 
firms’ advertising choices are intentional. 
A second response to using advertising to diagnose market failures may be an 
argument commonly used by economists responding to critics of persuasive 
advertising: Persuasive advertising is actually communicating useful information 
 
PROCEEDINGS 408, 410 (2004). 
 72.  Cf. BAR-GILL, supra note 14, at 9 (“Demand is now a function of perceived benefits and prices, 
rather than of actual benefits and prices . . . .”). 
 73.  Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 18.  
 74.  For an example of how researchers trained people to use Resnik and Stern’s paradigm, see 
Resnik & Stern, supra note 50. 
 75.  Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 18. 
 76.  As one recent example, see generally Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. 
REV. 1373 (2015).  
 77.  Seounmi Youn et al., Restricting Gambling Advertising and the Third-Person Effect, 17 
PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 633, 635 (2000). 
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to consumers even if it does not do so on its face. For instance, economist Kyle 
Bagwell argues that “even if [an advertisement for a good] contains no direct 
information, the fact that the good is advertised may suggest that the seller is 
efficient and thus that the good is aggressively priced.”78 Furthermore, persuasive 
advertising can remind consumers of prior positive experiences with a product 
even without communicating information.79 
Like the first criticism, however, this one is not necessarily a criticism of this 
article’s approach. Even if persuasive advertising can be useful, and even if 
advertisements aimed at exploiting behavioral biases nonetheless communicate 
useful information, it does not follow that firms are intending to communicate 
that information. If the real goal of persuasive advertising is to prove that the 
company is efficient and therefore offers lower prices, for instance, we would 
expect the company to take a more direct approach and simply advertise this 
information directly. The motivation to produce advertisements aimed at 
consumers’ behavioral mistakes is not to communicate information about the 
firm’s efficiency. Instead, it is to try to manipulate the market. So we can still 
learn about the behavioral biases present in the market through advertisements, 
even if those advertisements serve a useful function, as defenders of persuasive 
advertising maintain they do. 
A third compelling critique may be that even if advertising does aim at 
exploiting behavioral biases, that would not prove that enough consumers in a 
given market suffer from the bias to affect the market as a whole. Consumers are 
heterogeneous, so showing that advertising is aimed at a behavioral bias does not 
show that the cognitive defect affects a substantial number of consumers in the 
market.80 
The foundation of this potential criticism is true—some customers in every 
market are sophisticated. For the most part, however, policymakers have little to 
worry about with those consumers because they will use the deals and 
advertisements aimed at myopic customers to their own advantage.81 Thus, even 
if advertising enables detection of a market failure that only affects part of the 
market, the naïve market participants are the ones that policies generally aim to 
protect, so the project seems worthwhile despite this drawback because it will 
help those consumers at whom policies are often aimed. Second, the fact that 
some consumers are sophisticated and some are naïve actually shows another 
 
 78.  Bagwell, supra note 12, at 1719; see also Warneryd, supra note 19, at 111 (“Even if considerable 
weakness in advertising information exists—despite advertising self-regulation and government 
regulation—the consumer can usually get some information about product quality from advertising.”). 
 79.  Bagwell, supra note 12, at 1718–19. 
 80.  See Thomas A. Durkin et al., An Assessment of Behavioral Law and Economics Contentions and 
What We Know Empirically About Credit Card Use by Consumers, 22 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9 (2014) 
(“[E]ven if these characteristics describe some consumers sometimes, the number is quantitatively small 
to the point that their impact on the overall functioning of credit markets is unimportant. If so, then 
standard economic analysis is not undermined as a descriptor of the fundamentals of consumer behavior 
with respect to credit, even after taking into account the findings and contentions of the psychologists 
and the survey researchers and marketers concerning variations in consumer behavior.”).  
 81.  Gabiax & Laibson, supra note 18, at 509–10. 
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reason that advertising is a good resource for understanding market failure. In 
studying advertisements, we can measure the prevalence of different types of 
advertisements. If irrational consumers make up only a very small portion of the 
market, we would expect to see very little advertising aimed at them and the 
majority of the advertising aimed at rational actors. The prevalence of types 
advertising therefore provides a proxy for what firms consider to be the makeup 
of the market and the prevalence of the behavioral market failure.82 
IV 
EXPLOITING REVERSE MORTGAGE ADVERTISING 
To this point in the article, the discussion of the theory and mechanics of how 
to diagnose behavioral market failure through advertising has been in the 
abstract. This part applies the proposal using new empirical data about reverse 
mortgage advertisements. This case study illustrates the proposal’s operation in 
a concrete context and helps to evaluate its usefulness as a research strategy. 
A. The Reverse Mortgage Market 
In a reverse mortgage, lenders send money to borrowers, reversing the 
payment stream of a traditional mortgage.83 In exchange for the loan, borrowers 
grant liens on their homes.84 Because the lender is the one making payments, the 
arrangement does not require that borrowers have any income.85 
Currently, only 2–3% of eligible homeowners have reverse mortgages,86 and 
reverse mortgages comprise only 1% of the traditional mortgage market.87 Yet, 
   
 
 82.  See, e.g., Jim Hawkins, Using Advertisements to Diagnose Behavioral Market Failure in the 
Payday Lending Market, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 57 (2016) (using payday advertising as an example 
of this analysis). 
 83.  Debra Pogrund Stark et. al., Complex Decision-Making and Cognitive Aging Call for Enhanced 
Protection of Seniors Contemplating Reverse Mortgages, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 302 (2014); see also Paul 
V. Black, Reverse Mortgages and the Current Financial Crisis, 8 NAELA J. 87, 95 (2012) (“In a reverse 
mortgage transaction, however, the stream of payments is reversed; that is, the lender is paying the 
borrower. Thus, the outstanding total balance owed by the borrower will not shrink, but rather grow over 
time.”). 
 84.  Black, supra note 83, at 102. 
 85.  Id. at 92; Ben Jakubowicz, What the Hecm Is A Reverse Mortgage: The Importance of the Home 
Equity Conversion Mortgage in an Aging America, 54 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 183, 187 (2016) (“Because 
reverse mortgage borrowers are not required to make payments to lenders, traditional debt-to-income 
analysis does not play a determinative role in the HECM guidelines.”). 
 86.  CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON REVERSE MORTGAGES 14 
(2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/documents/201206_cfpb_Reverse_Mortgage_Report 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4C7-RP36] [hereinafter CFPB 2012 REPORT]. 
 87.  Jennifer Juergens, Reverse Mortgage Complexity Is Negatively Impacting Older Americans, 6 
HOUS. L. REV. 209, 210 (2016).  
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the number of seniors is increasing,88 and the number of people using this form 
of credit is rising astronomically.89 
There are multiple types of reverse mortgage products,90 but Home Equity 
Conversion Mortgages (HECMs) are by far the most common type of reverse 
mortgage.91 For lenders, HECMs are federally insured by the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development and its division, the Federal Housing 
Administration,92 and the vast majority are securitized as Ginnie Mae mortgage 
backed securities.93 In contrast to the secondary market, the structure of the 
market for reverse mortgage originators is diffuse, with many small companies 
originating most loans.94 
Because most reverse mortgages are HECMs, which are governed by the 
National Housing Act,95 they all share a set of required characteristics: only 
people over 62 qualify for the loan,96 the loan amounts are limited to $417,000 (or 
$625,000 in some areas),97 there are no limitations for the most part on the 
senior’s use of the proceeds,98 and no repayment is required until the borrower 
 
 88.  CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 41–42 (“Census figures project that the number of people 
over age 60 will reach 75 million by 2020, and 92 million by 2030. Given homeownership rates among 
older homeowners, there are likely to be nearly 40 million eligible homeowner households headed by 
someone 62 or older by 2030.”). 
 89.  See Jakubowicz, supra note 85, at 184 (“The number of reverse mortgages originated in 2008 
was twenty-two times higher than in 2009. While reverse mortgages are growing in popularity, they have 
yet to gain a large share of the market. As of 2012, less than 3% of eligible homeowners have a reverse 
mortgage. However, the impending influx of baby boomers reaching retirement age, the appealing terms 
of reverse mortgages, and today’s restrictive conventional mortgage lending environment suggest that 
reverse mortgages will play a prominent role in the financial landscape over the next twenty years.”); 
Stark et al., supra note 83, at 299 (“Many seniors have expressed interest in this unique type of financing, 
and this number has grown exponentially in recent years, as there were ten times the number of seniors 
entering into reverse mortgages in 2007 as there were in 2001.”). 
 90.  See Wendy Little Schieke, The Advisability of Reverse Mortgage to Pay for Care Needs, 47 MD. 
B.J., no. 3, June 2014, at 26 (“There are three types of reverse mortgages: the Home Equity Conversion 
Mortgage (‘HECM’), the proprietary reverse mortgage [i.e., reverse mortgages for amounts higher than 
permitted for HECMs], and the single-purpose reverse mortgage [e.g., a reverse mortgage granted 
through a state or local program to use for paying real estate taxes].”). 
 91.  Black, supra note 83, at 92 (“Qualification criteria for reverse mortgages insured by the Federal 
Housing Authority and offered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which currently 
make up 98 percent of the reverse mortgage marketplace, and are known as Home Equity Conversion 
Mortgages (HECMs), are relatively straightforward.”); Stark et al., supra note 83, at 301 (“The most 
common type of reverse mortgage loan is the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM), insured by 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) (constituting over 90% of all reverse mortgage loans 
originated in the U.S. market).”). 
 92.  Black, supra note 83, at 92. 
 93.  Dan Latona, Reversing Course: Strengthening Consumer Protections for Reverse Mortgages, 23 
ELDER L.J. 417, 428 (2016). 
 94.  Jakubowicz, supra note 85, at 194–95. 
 95.  12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20 (2012). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id.; see Stark et al., supra note 83, at 303–04 (“Prior to closing, the house is appraised to 
determine its value and to make sure that it meets FHA minimum property standards.”). 
 98.  12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20 (2013). 
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dies, moves, sells, or fails to comply with specific terms of the loan.99 The specific 
loan obligations include things like maintaining the home in good repair, having 
mortgage insurance, paying taxes, not moving out of the home for more than 
twelve continuous months, and not allowing other liens on the property.100 
Borrowers can elect for the lender to pay out HECMs as a lump-sum upfront, to 
make fixed payments over time, or to create a line of credit that the borrower can 
access.101 
Academics and policymakers have suggested several reasons that reverse 
mortgages are economically efficient choices for some seniors. First, reverse 
mortgages allow borrowers to use the equity that they have built in their home 
over a long period of time without selling the home.102 Often the most valuable 
asset a senior has is the senior’s home, which represents years of monthly 
payments to a forward mortgage. After paying off that traditional mortgage, the 
money is illiquid without a loan. Wong and Evans explain: 
This loan structure was specifically designed to fit the needs of a very specific borrower: 
an elderly homeowner who (1) had few liquid assets, (2) was committed to aging in his 
or her current home, and (3) did not intend to pass the home to a beneficiary as part of 
his or her estate. For these borrowers, this type of loan allows them to access the equity 
in their homes for the purpose of supplementing their income while living there without 
having to worry about a repayment schedule.103 
Access to the equity in a senior’s home is particularly valuable in the case of 
reverse mortgages because there are no restrictions on the use of the money, so 
seniors can allocate the cash to best meet their needs.104 Additionally, the cash is  
  
 
 99.  Id.; If a borrower does not live in the house for twelve months in a row, the borrower has 
“moved” under most reverse mortgage agreements. Black, supra note 83, at 102. 
 100.  Black, supra note 83, at 102; Latona, supra note 93, at 425–26. 
 101.  Black, supra note 83, at 95. 
 102.  CFPB 2012 Report, supra note 86, at 5; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., REVERSE 
MORTGAGES: PRODUCT COMPLEXITY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES UNDERSCORE NEED 
FOR IMPROVED CONTROLS OVER COUNSELING FOR BORROWERS 3, 7 (June 2009), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09606.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6E5-H95A] [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
(“Congress established the HECM program as a way to alleviate economic hardship caused by the 
increasing costs of health, housing, and subsistence needs at a time in life when income is reduced. 
Consistent with this goal, HECMs allow senior homeowners to convert their home equity into cash 
advances, while maintaining ownership of their homes. HECM borrowers have indicated that the 
mortgages have helped them to meet their financial needs.”). 
 103.  Elliot Wong & Ingrid Evans, Protecting Borrowers from the Pitfalls of Reverse Mortgages, 24 
EXPERIENCE, no. 2, 20, 20 (Summer 2014). 
 104.  See GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 7 (“HECMs can provide senior homeowners with multiple 
types of benefits, including the flexibility to use the money received . . . . Because there are no restrictions 
on how the money received from a HECM can be used, borrowers can choose to use the funds for 
necessities, such as housing, medication, or groceries, or for other purposes, such as vacations.”); Black, 
supra note 83, at 97 (“So what makes reverse mortgages an attractive product in spite of their high cost? 
First, there are no restrictions on how homeowners can spend their reverse mortgage proceeds, enabling 
reverse mortgage holders to pay for health care items not covered by Medicare and Medicaid, such as 
eyeglasses, dentures, additional in-home care, or essential overhead expenses such as home repairs, 
utility bills, and homeowner’s insurance. Some homeowners even use the proceeds of their reverse 
mortgage to pay off their current “forward mortgage,” leaving them the remainder as spendable 
income.”). 
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tax-free even when it serves as a surrogate source of income because it is a loan 
based on the home’s equity, not income.105 
Second, taking out reverse mortgages is an economically efficient choice for 
seniors who do not have a steady income and would have difficulty qualifying for 
other types of loans.106 Traditional loans require monthly payments, so borrowers 
generally have to prove that they can make the payments.107 Since there are no 
monthly payments with reverse mortgages, borrowers without steady incomes 
can still qualify. 
Third, reverse mortgages are non-recourse loans. Most collateralized loans, 
even mortgages, obligate the borrower to repay the debt if the sale of the 
collateral does not generate a sufficient amount.108 Reverse mortgages, however, 
never result in judgements or debt-collection calls for paying loan balances that 
remain after the lender forecloses on the home.109 Protection from personal 
liability is valuable because it acts as a backstop to protect borrowers from 
financial distress.110 
Understanding these reasons that commentators posit as economically 
rational reasons for obtaining a reverse mortgage is important. If the reverse 
mortgage market is experiencing behavioral market failure, then the approach 
advocated in this article would predict that reverse mortgage advertising would 
appeal to features of reverse mortgages other than these rational reasons. 
Despite the fact that no regular payments are required, reverse mortgages do 
entail risks and costs for borrowers, and these risks and costs are larger than they 
appear at first glance. One major risk is that borrowers will default on their loan 
obligations, obligating them to repay the loan or lose the house.111 In fact, the 
default rate is over five times higher for reverse mortgages than for traditional 
mortgages—almost ten percent.112 Seniors can default if they run out of money 
to pay taxes or mortgage insurance premiums or to repair their homes, and they 
 
 105.  Leslie R. Ramos, Chapter 202: California Provides Further Protection for Seniors Contemplating 
Reverse Mortgage Loans, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 45, 51 (2007); see also Black, supra note 83, at 97 
(“[T]here is no tax upon the proceeds because the borrowers are (at least initially) ‘borrowing’ against 
their home equity.”). 
 106.  See Ramos, supra note 105, at 51; Stark et al., supra note 83, at 317–18. 
 107.  15 U.S.C. § 1639(h) (2015) (“A creditor shall not engage in a pattern or practice of extending 
credit to consumers under mortgages referred to in section 1602(aa) 1 of this title based on the consumers’ 
collateral without regard to the consumers’ repayment ability, including the consumers’ current and 
expected income, current obligations, and employment.”).  
 108.  E.g., U.C.C. § 9-615 (2010); see generally Kristen Barnes, “Pennies on the Dollar”: Reallocating 
Risk and Deficiency Judgment Liability, 66 S.C. L. REV. 243 (2014) (describing the risk of deficiency 
judgments that most homeowners face). 
 109.  CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 111. 
 110.  See generally Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between Fringe 
Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361 (2011) (explaining how fringe banking products are 
non-recourse structurally insulates borrowers from financial distress).  
 111.  After borrowers trigger one of the bases for repayment being due, they (or their estates) have 
six months to repay the debt or the lender must foreclose on the home. Latona, supra note 93, at 425–26. 
 112.  Jakubowicz, supra note 85, at 184, 194. 
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face greater risks than people who are still in the workforce.113 In 2010, for 
instance, the Department of Housing and Urban Development found that 
“servicers were holding approximately 13,000 loans in default due to nonpayment 
of property charges.”114 Seniors’ health also increases the likelihood of default 
because the loans require borrowers to reside in the home and not, for instance, 
an assisted living facility for an extended period of time. And borrowers must be 
healthy enough to ensure that the home remains in good repair.115 Facing 
foreclosure is a serious risk because seniors can suffer emotionally and physically 
by losing their home, and they may have financial trouble moving.116 
A second significant disadvantage of reverse mortgages is their high cost. 
Reverse mortgages are substantially more expensive than traditional 
mortgages.117 Borrowers must pay mortgage insurance premiums, an origination 
fee, servicing fees, and relatively high interest charges.118 If the borrower has the 
ability to pursue other options, reverse mortgages are extremely likely to be an 
inefficient choice because of the high cost.119 These high fees threaten to devour 
all of the equity that the borrower has in the home.120 Because the home’s equity 
is likely the largest source of wealth for any given senior, the loss of that equity is 
a serious concern.121 
Finally, borrowers who take out reverse mortgages can risk losing 
government benefits that depend on net assets or monthly income, often without 
 
 113.  Annie E. Nelson, Reverse Mortgages: Changes Brought About by the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 337, 359 (2009). 
 114.  Latona, supra note 93, at 446. 
 115.  See Stark et al., supra note 83, at 328 (“It also needs to be practical for the homeowner to manage 
the home, because the major obligations for entering into this type of loan include making necessary 
repairs, paying for insurance, and keeping up with payment of property taxes.”). 
 116.  Juergens, supra note 87, at 218. 
 117.  Jakubowicz, supra note 85, at 192. 
 118.  GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 10–11; see also Jakubowicz, supra note 85, at 192 (“The costs 
of reverse mortgages are much higher than those of conventional mortgages. For example, assume a 
seventy-five year old borrower with a home valued at $250,000 takes a lump-sum disbursement of $67,500 
at an interest rate of 7%. Origination fees, third-party closing costs like title and appraisal fees, and 2.5% 
up-front MIP total over $12,000. After two years, the total financing charges including interest, service 
fees, and annual MIP of 1.25%, the loan amount exceeds $25,000! Moreover, the finance charges exceed 
$50,000 after only five years. Although these costs are rolled into the loan and not repaid to the lender 
until a triggering event occurs, the reality is that reduced costs and MIPs would enable the senior to take 
larger disbursements later in life. By contrast, the closing costs on a conventional mortgage are closer to 
$2,500.87.”). 
 119.  Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt Burdens of 
Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 198 (2007) 
(“[A]lthough reverse mortgages are a solution for some seniors facing debts they would otherwise be 
unable to pay, reverse mortgages can be much more costly than other types of loans because of their 
higher up-front fees.”). 
 120.  Wong & Evans, supra note 103, at 21 (“A home is the average consumer’s single largest asset. 
Using a reverse mortgage to borrow against the accumulated value of one’s home is costly and may even 
totally deplete the home’s equity.”). 
 121.  Tara Twomey, Crossing Paths: The Intersection of Reverse Mortgages and Bankruptcy, 89 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 363, 368 (2015) (“For many seniors, their home is their most valuable asset. Equity built up 
over several decades can represent a significant amount of wealth.”). 
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even considering that risk.122 Juergens explains how accepting monthly payments 
may limit seniors’ access to some types of financial assistance for which they 
would otherwise qualify: 
Because these kinds of assistance programs are based on older Americans’ financial 
position, those who take loan proceeds that exceed the designated monthly limit might 
jeopardize their eligibility for assistance. For instance, borrowers with liquid resources 
[of] more than $2,000 for individuals and $3,000 for couples lose eligibility for SSI.123  
On the other hand, other commentary offers the exact opposite advice, 
arguing that borrowers should be careful taking out the money as a lump sum: 
“[U]nless homeowners choose to receive their reverse mortgage proceeds as a 
lump-sum advance, there is no effect on their Social Security or Medicare 
benefits.”124 Regardless of exactly how borrowers may lose government benefits, 
it is a risk that borrowers should assess. 
B. Using Advertising To Detect Behavioral Biases In The Reverse Mortgage 
Market 
With that background in mind, the question arises: Is the reverse mortgage 
market experiencing behavioral market failure? The reverse mortgage market is 
fertile ground for behavioral economic analysis because the transaction is 
complicated and involves predictions about the future. Articles about reverse 
mortgages frequently claim that the product is complex.125 Seniors must make a 
variety of decisions about how their loan will work, and each decision adds a layer 
of complexity.126 One level of complexity involves the different ways that 
borrowers can opt to obtain cash—immediate lump sums versus set payments 
over time, for instance.127 Adding to the complexity, borrowers can also opt for 
 
 122.  The GAO in 2009 criticized existing counseling programs for failing to inform borrowers about 
the potential loss of benefits. GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 35–37. 
 123.  Juergens, supra note 87, at 218. 
 124.  Black, supra note 83, at 97. 
 125.  See CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 7 (“Reverse mortgages are complex products and 
difficult for consumers to understand.”); GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 46 (“[T]he product is 
relatively complex and costly and the population it serves is vulnerable.”); Ramos, supra note 105, at 51 
(“The complexity of reverse mortgages can lead to fraud or misunderstanding for borrowers.”); see 
generally Juergens, supra note 87 (using the word complex twenty eight times); Latona, supra note 93 
(using the word complex thirty six times); Stark et al., supra note 83 (using the word complicated twenty 
one times).  
 126.  Jakubowicz, supra note 85, at 188 (“The HECM product is highly customizable, and if used 
properly, can be custom-tailored to provide senior homeowners with benefits not available through 
traditional lending products. Conversely, the myriad of options can be very confusing and may result in 
the borrower obtaining a very costly and ineffective loan.”); Stark et al., supra note 83, at 307 (“[T]he 
presence of so many choices adds to the cognitive complexity of the decision making that seniors must 
undertake and may cause many seniors to be unable to process all of the information they need to when 
deciding whether the offered reverse mortgage is suitable for them.”). 
 127.  Latona, supra note 93, at 427 (“[B]orrowers who choose the adjustable-rate product can choose 
from any of the six different options for receiving their loan proceeds. Those disbursement options are: 
1) line of credit; 2) fixed monthly disbursement for a fixed number of years; 3) fixed monthly 
disbursement for as long as the borrower lives in the home; 4) a combination of options one and two; 5) 
a combination of options one and three; and 6) lump sum . . . .”). 
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adjustable interest rates or fixed rates.128 The complexity of adjustable rate loans 
is a common source of criticism from behavioral economists in different credit 
products.129 Also, borrowers who care about the equity they will retain in the 
home after the loan ends—a common concern—face complex decisions because 
predicting future equity requires accurate predictions about the “borrower 
decisions, interest rates, and home values . . . .”130 
Scholars have identified a wide variety of potential biases in the reverse 
mortgage market.131 One limitation to the existing literature’s approach to 
assessing consumers’ biases, however, is that there is little empirical proof on the 
topic. The empirical studies of reverse mortgage advertising only address 
whether the advertisements are actually deceptive under legal standards, not 
whether they frame the transaction in a way that exploits poor decisionmaking.132 
In addition, Stark et al.’s excellent work on behavioral biases and reverse 
mortgages points to “potential” biases that might operate in the market.133 The 
problem with merely identifying potential biases in a market is that sometimes 
consumers in specific markets behave differently than behavioral economic 
theory suggests they will.134 Thus, to ensure that laws solve real problems, it is 
important to have some empirical justification for regulatory intervention. This 
 
 128.  CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 100; see also Stark et al., supra note 83, at 307 (“It also 
should be noted that while lenders are supposed to offer both fixed and adjustable rate loans under 
HECMs, in practice the loans accrue interest at a floating rate because the interest rates for a fixed rate 
loan (unless the entire amount of the loan is funded immediately) are offered at a significantly higher 
rate than the initial floating rate. If interest rates over the term of the loan rise significantly, this will cause 
the HECM to be even more costly than anticipated and reduce the amount of money the senior can draw 
on the loan, causing the senior to receive less than he or she expected and might need. This, then, is 
another risky feature of HECM loans versus a conventional loan, where it is not uncommon for that loan 
to accrue interest at a fixed rate, especially when, as now, interest rates are at historic lows.”). 
 129.  Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now-Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 50–
51 (2011). 
 130.  GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 11–12. 
 131.  The most comprehensive research suggesting biases in this market is Stark et al., supra note 83. 
 132.  For instance, the FTC has searched for deceptive advertisements but not for advertisements 
aimed at suboptimal decisionmaking. See GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 15 (“FTC officials stated that 
they have conducted systematic searches of all forms of media, including Internet, print, and television 
advertisements for potential violations of the FTC Act.”). 
 133.  See, e.g., Stark et al., supra note 83, at 303 (“[S]eniors may not adequately take these continuing 
home expenses into account when they decide to enter into a reverse mortgage.”) (emphasis added); id. 
at 335 (suggesting sales people “might” exploit behavioral biases); id. at 309 (“Another problem with 
financing these costs is that the senior might not notice how high these costs are when they are not coming 
out of her pocket directly at closing.”) (emphasis added); id. at 343 (“One potentially protective 
phenomenon is risk aversion (under which consumers fear losses such as losing their homes more than 
they appreciate gains such as the money that they could receive from taking out a reverse mortgage). 
This phenomenon could potentially be protective if it were to cause seniors to avoid reverse mortgages 
on the grounds that they are too risky when the reverse mortgage would in fact not best meet the senior’s 
needs.”) (emphasis added).  
 134.  As just one example, there are many people who claim that auto title loan borrowers are overly 
optimistic about their ability to repay the loans, but empirical evidence that tests the claim directly 
suggests otherwise. See Kathryn Fritzdixon et. al., Dude, Where’s My Car Title?: The Law, Behavior, and 
Economics of Title Lending Markets, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1042 (“People are relatively good at 
predicting their ability to repay, although there is room for improvement.”). 
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subpart applies the general approach of this article to the reverse mortgage 
market to offer concrete evidence that consumers are making irrational decisions 
when evaluating this financial product. 
Advertising matters to reverse mortgage firms. In recent years, advertising 
for reverse mortgages has increased, using celebrities to draw in borrowers.135 
Some commentary predicts that marketing will increase use of these loans.136 
Numerous sources claim these advertisements are misleading137 or may exploit 
poor decisionmaking.138  
Two government studies of reverse mortgage advertisements provide a 
foundation for assessing whether we can learn about behavioral biases in this 
market by exploiting advertising—a 2009 study by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and a 2015 study by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB). The GAO reviewed marketing material (including 
Internet, mail, and television advertising) from the HECM lenders that 
originated more than 1,000 loans in 2008.139 The CFPB’s study reviewed ninety-
seven advertisements from the Internet, television, radio, print, and mail from 
five major U.S. cities that appeared in March 2013 to March 2014.140 The CFPB 
also spoke with seniors about their impressions of the advertisements.141 
The GAO and CFPB both identified some of the same problems in the 
advertisements that they reviewed, but they also each found some issues that the 
 
 135.  Juergens, supra note 87 at 218–19; Little Schieke, supra note 90, at 26; Nelson, supra note 113, 
at 361. 
 136.  Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 842 (2005). One CLE even 
suggests that the government advertise reverse mortgages to inform consumers and stimulate borrowing. 
Katharine G. Abraham & Benjamin H. Harris, Better Financial Security in Retirement? Realizing the 
Promise of Longevity Annuities (2015) (“If nothing else, these factors suggest a role for public policy to 
help bridge the information gap and better inform consumers about the potential benefits of longevity 
annuities as part of a more comprehensive financial plan. One constructive step could be a set of 
government guidelines aimed at helping older Americans make sound financial decisions. This could be 
accomplished by the issuance of a financial security graphic, similar to the MyPlate graphic for nutrition 
(formerly the food pyramid) . . . . No financial product is for everyone, but an effective graphic could 
point individuals towards potentially useful financial and insurance products, including longevity 
annuities as well as reverse mortgages . . . .”).  
 137.  See Nelson, supra note 113, at 361 (“These commercials add to the misunderstanding of the 
product.”); Ramos, supra note 105, at 46 (“Some lenders use misleading and illegitimate means to 
defraud or confuse potential borrowers, including failing to completely inform customers of all their 
options and implying that certain products, such as annuities, are necessary, hoping to take advantage of 
the “gold mine in equity locked up” in the homes of seniors.”); Wong & Evans, supra note 103, at 21–22 
(asserting that reverse mortgage advertisements use “illicit tactics”). See also  Andrew C. Helman, Putting 
Equity Back in Reverse Mortgages: How State Legislatures Can Bring Fairness to Home Equity 
Conversion Mortgages, 12 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 415, 443 (“Lastly, misleading advertising also 
plagues the industry.”).  
 138.  Stark et al., supra note 83, at 335–36. 
 139.  GAO REPORT supra note 102, at 3. 
 140.  CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, OFF. FOR OLDER AMERICANS, A CLOSER LOOK AT 
REVERSE MORTGAGE ADVERTISEMENTS AND CONSUMER RISKS 5, 12 (June 2015), http://files 
.consumerfinance.gov/f/201506_cfpb_a-closer-look-at-reverse-mortgage-advertising.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/3J3R-DYPB] [hereafter CFPB 2015 REPORT]. 
 141.  Id. at 12–13. 
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other study did not find. Combining the two reports, the two agencies found the 
following types of potentially misleading claims in the advertising they reviewed: 
• Advertising that stated the borrower would “[n]ever owe more than 
the value of your home;” 142 
• Advertising that implied a reverse mortgage is a government 
benefit;143 
• Advertising that stated the loan will pay income for life;144 
• Advertising that stated the borrower can “[n]ever lose your home;”145 
• Advertising that suggested a government affiliation146 or stated that 
the loans were backed by the government;147Advertising that stated 
reverse mortgages were only available in specific locations or for 
specific periods of time;148 
• Advertising suggesting young people should take out reverse 
mortgages;149 and 
• Advertising that contained fine print.150 
Under traditional content analysis,151 all of these advertising claims are 
informative. They all communicate attributes of the product such as price (“never 
owe more than your home”), quality (“government-sponsored”), contents 
(“income for life”), or availability (specific locations/time periods). But, just 
because the advertisements inform does not mean they inform rational 
consumers. The following assesses whether rational-choice economic theory or 
behavioral economic theory offers a better explanation for the existence of each 
of these types of advertising.152 
 
 142.  GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 21. 
 143.  Id.; see also CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 6 (“After viewing ads, some consumers did 
not understand that reverse mortgage proceeds would have to be repaid in the future . . . . After viewing 
television advertisements that do not highlight repayment terms, many consumers expressed surprise 
when shown a printed ad stating interest rates.”). 
 144.  GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 22. 
 145.  Id.; CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 7. 
 146.  GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 22. 
 147.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 8. 
 148.  GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 22. 
 149.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 9 (“Consumers said reverse mortgage advertisements 
promoted living a good lifestyle while being young enough to enjoy it, or to travel while they still have 
their health. Several said the advertisements suggested that consumers should get a reverse mortgage 
while they are young and healthy enough to enjoy the money. Images of active, youthful retirees were a 
common feature among ads shown to consumers. Ads typically depicted seniors riding bicycles, playing 
golf, or enjoying similar leisure activities.”). 
 150.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 7 (“About half of the advertisements collected by the 
CFPB included some type of ‘fine print.’ Most consumers we spoke with, however, could not read the 
fine print in printed ads, and none of the consumers we talked to could read the fine print that was used 
in television ads. Ads that included information about borrower requirements typically did so in fine 
print. Fine print generally addressed tax and insurance requirements, property maintenance and 
residency requirements, repayment terms, and other important details about the loans.”). 
 151.  See supra notes 57–58.  
 152.  I do not discuss the explicitly false advertising that the reverse mortgage product is only available 
for a limited time or in a limited location. This advertising, while informative, is pure fraud. I am less 
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1. Advertising About Price 
Several types of advertising described in the reports are about the cost of 
reverse mortgages to seniors. Advertising that implies that the consumer will 
never owe more than the value of the house communicates an upper price limit 
for the loan, and advertising that implies that a reverse mortgage is a government 
benefit communicates that the government, not the consumer, is paying. The final 
type of advertising—fine print—is another place that pricing information 
appeared. The fine print sometimes contained explicit interest rate and fee 
information.153 
Price information is relevant to a rational borrower.154 It is particularly 
relevant for rational reverse-mortgage customers because there is price variation 
within the market—not all lenders charge the maximum allowable rates.155 
People who are interested in reverse mortgages but do not ultimately get one 
report that the high costs were what drove them away,156 so advertising aimed at 
discussing prices makes sense under traditional economic models. 
But, does rational-choice theory explain why direct statements about price 
appear in the fine print? Does it clarify why misleading information about price—
implications about the government providing the loans as a benefit or the 
borrower never owing more than the home—appear in the main part of the 
advertisement?157 Most rational borrowers highly value accurate pricing 
information, so it is hard to articulate why they would want it hidden in the fine 
print. 
So, if a rational borrower would want price information upfront and 
accessible, why do advertisers put it in fine print? Behavioral economics provides 
a persuasive explanation for this advertising feature—limited attention. Research 
suggests that in complicated transactions people can only focus on a small 
number of the transaction’s attributes.158 Again, the limitation is especially acute 
for older individuals because, research demonstrates, they have more trouble 
concentrating,159 have weaker short-term and working memory,160 and frequently 
are financially illiterate.161 In the context of reverse mortgages, borrowers might 
 
interested in actual fraud because it appears trade organizations police the industry for fraudulent 
marketing. GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 20 n.21.  
 153.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 6–7. 
 154.  See Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 54 (2006) 
(noting the price is usually the most important term of any transaction). 
 155.  Nelson, supra note 113, at 350. 
 156.  Id. at 349.  
 157.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 6.  
 158.  Fritzdixon et al., supra note 134, at 1047–49. 
 159.  See Stark et al., supra note 83, at 329–30 (“[T]he ability to concentrate declines by the time a 
person has reached their mid-50s. By the time seniors are faced with the decision on whether to take out 
a reverse mortgage, these abilities are already seriously compromised.”). 
 160.  Id. at 330. 
 161.  See Loonin & Renuart, supra note 119, at 170 (“In addition, all consumers find themselves 
forced to navigate an increasingly complex marketplace that requires choosing quickly and often between 
complicated goods and services. The effects of such market complexities may be especially troublesome 
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focus on one aspect of the transaction while neglecting some other important 
feature. 
  The fact that firms shroud cost information by making other product 
attributes more prominent is evidence that firms expect borrowers to 
underestimate the cost of a reverse mortgage. Reverse mortgages are expensive, 
sometimes costing eighteen percent of the loan amount without even factoring in 
interest.162 But, borrowers never actually pay money to the mortgage company 
until the loan is due, so they “may have trouble understanding the extent of 
accruing servicing, interest, insurance, and financed upfront costs . . . . Research 
has found that consumers often focus on short-term costs and underestimate 
long-term costs.”163 The advertising for reverse mortgages that focuses on 
abstract statements of cost instead of actual costs provides evidence that the 
market is failing. Seniors, hampered by limited attention, underestimate the cost 
of the credit, preventing them from making rational decisions about the credit’s 
value.164 
2. Advertising About Obtaining Income For Life 
Advertisements that promote reverse mortgages as providing income for life, 
if true,165 appear to tap directly into one of the main economic benefits of reverse 
mortgages—obtaining access to the equity in a home.166 Commentary offers 
strong justifications for seniors entering into reverse mortgages to access their 
cash, so it appears that rational borrowers would seek this information from 
lenders. Because there is a rational choice explanation for this type of advertising, 
there is no need to offer an alternative behavioral explanation, and we should 
assume these advertisements (assuming they are true) do not indicate behavioral 
market failure. 
3. Advertising About The Risk Of Foreclosure 
Some advertisements downplayed the risk of borrowers losing their homes 
through a reverse mortgage. Rational reverse-mortgage borrowers, many of 
whom explicitly express a preference for staying in their home,167 would want to 
know whether they could lose their home to foreclosure and how likely that is, 
and firms might advertise this information to compete with other forms of credit 
that borrowers might consider, such as selling their homes or home equity 
 
with respect to seniors because of pervasive financial illiteracy among older Americans.”). 
 162.  Stark et al., supra note 83, at 318. 
 163.  CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 111; see also Stark et al., supra note 83, at 309 (“Another 
problem with financing these costs is that the senior might not notice how high these costs are when they 
are not coming out of her pocket directly at closing.”). 
 164.  Bar-Gill, supra note 154, at 1402.  
 165.  The CFPB suggests reasons these claims are spurious. CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 
10.  
 166.  See supra notes 101–105.  
 167.  CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 47 (“According to a 2010 industry poll, 81 percent of 
reverse mortgage borrowers say they plan to remain in their current home for the rest of their life.”). 
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loans.168 Both the GAO and CFPB report that the advertisements along these 
lines stated that seniors could never lose their homes.169 This is not accurate 
because there are multiple ways that a borrower can default on a reverse 
mortgage, thereby losing the home.170 So, though a rational borrower would want 
to know the likelihood of defaulting, the information contained in reverse 
mortgage advertisements does not communicate that to borrowers. 
So why do reverse mortgage firms tell potential borrowers that they will never 
lose their homes? One of the most documented biases in the behavioral 
economics literature, the optimism bias, offers a compelling reason. At the time 
they take out a reverse mortgage, borrowers might be overly optimistic about the 
likelihood that they will become too sick to live in the house or that they will be 
unable to pay for home insurance.171 Seniors might be particularly likely to 
underestimate the likelihood of default because, research suggests, “as people get 
older they have a tendency to focus more and more on positive information and 
to focus less on negative information.”172 
In addition to exploiting over-optimism, advertisements also play off 
borrowers’ limited attention by putting details about the exact ways that a 
borrower can lose a home in fine print. Latona points to the examples of two 
advertisements, one involving “the Fonz,” Henry Winkler, and one involving 
former Senator Fred Thompson. In both, the celebrity tells borrowers about the 
benefits of reverse mortgages while the fine print informs borrowers that they 
will still be responsible for paying insurance, taxes, and maintenance of the 
home.173 
These advertisements that capitalize on over-optimism and limited attention 
offer evidence that firms believe that borrowers in the reverse mortgage market 
are acting irrationally when choosing to enter into a reverse mortgage. This 
suggests that borrowers underestimate the risk of default and thereby misjudge 
the value of the overall transaction, causing behavioral market failure. 
 
 168.  Little Schieke, supra note 90, at 33. 
 169.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 7; GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 22. 
 170.  See Stark et al., supra note 83, at 318 (“A second major disadvantage to a senior entering into a 
reverse mortgage is the surprising fact that they will be in default and will have to repay the debt if they 
fail to live in the home for more than twelve months, even if this failure is due to the fact that the senior 
becomes sick or injured and needs care outside of the home.”). 
 171.  Jeurgens, supra note 87, at 217 (“The fact that people in general and older Americans specifically 
are overly optimistic may explain why reverse mortgages are attractive despite their high cost and risks. 
Consumers underestimate the likelihood of a negative outcomes from a reverse mortgage, so they fail to 
assess the true costs of the transaction.”); Stark et al, supra note 83, at 342 (suggesting the applicability 
of the optimism bias in this market and noting that some research finds that optimism increases with age). 
There is evidence of over-optimism in other credit markets. E.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 
NW. U.L. REV. 1373, 1401 (2004) (explaining that consumers’ underestimation of forgetfulness causes 
them to incur exorbitant credit card fees). 
 172.  Stark et al., supra note 83, at 332. 
 173.  Latona, supra note 93, at 418. 
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4. Advertising About Government Involvement 
The federal government has criticized reverse mortgage companies for 
confusing borrowers about the affiliation between lenders and the government.174 
Advertisements in the GAO and CFPB studies highlighted that the government 
backed reverse mortgages. Apart from the potential misrepresentation of 
suggesting an actual affiliation between the lender and the government, is there 
a rational-choice explanation for firms advertising that the government will pay 
back the lender if the borrower defaults on the loan? 
At face value, it seems strange that borrowers would care if the lender is 
protected by the government guaranteeing the loan’s repayment. Indeed, lenders 
are the primary beneficiaries of government involvement because such 
involvement ensures that lenders are repaid if the sale of the home does not 
generate sufficient proceeds to pay off the loan.175 
But, even the CFPB argues that the government’s involvement “provides 
some important protections for borrowers.”176 The benefit to borrowers cited in 
the reverse mortgage literature is that the government will make loan 
disbursements if the lender for some reason is unable to do so.177 This benefit 
might provide a rational-choice explanation for these advertisements. But as far 
as research has documented, there has never been a case where the lender did 
not disburse reverse mortgage funds.178 Thus, the borrower’s risk of nonpayment 
is miniscule, so it is hard to believe that rational borrowers are concerned about 
this risk. 
Behavioral economics has a compelling explanation for the emphasis on the 
government’s involvement—the halo effect. The halo effect occurs when people 
view one product or characteristic more favorably because they associate it with 
something they like.179 For instance, research shows that attractive people pay 
less than unattractive people in civil cases.180 In other consumer credit 
transactions, research suggests that borrowers do not shop around for the best 
lender when a trusted institution, a halo, backs a specific lender.181 
The people the CFPB interviewed appeared to view reverse mortgage lenders 
more favorably because of the government’s halo. One person thought the lender 
 
 174.  See Jason W. McElroy & Jeffrey P. Blackwood, Deceptive Advertising Practices Remain Hot 
Target for CFPB, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 432 (2014) (describing the CFPB enforcement actions 
against reverse mortgage companies). 
 175.  Jakubowicz, supra note 85, at 188. 
 176.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 11. 
 177.  GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 9; Jakubowicz, supra note 85, at 193;  Latona, supra note 93, 
at 424–25; Nelson, supra note 113, at 341; Stark et al., supra note 83, at 318. 
 178.  See CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 231 n.541 (“CFPB research produced no documented 
cases of a lender failing to meet payment obligations.”). 
 179.  For the work creating the term, see Edward L. Thorndike, A Constant Error in Psychological 
Ratings, 4 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 25 (1920). 
 180.  Joel D. Lieberman, Head over the Heart or Heart over the Head? Cognitive Experiential Self-
Theory and Extralegal Heuristics in Juror Decision Making, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2526, 2538–
39 (2002). 
 181.  MICHAEL WROBLEWSKI, HELPING FAMILIES FINANCE COLLEGE 9 (2007). 
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would not take advantage of her because the government was involved, while 
another said the government’s participation in the transaction “meant that 
reverse mortgage companies were more likely to look after consumer 
interests.”182 
The fact that firm advertising emphasizes the government’s involvement in 
the market is evidence that firms believe that borrowers are making suboptimal 
decisions in this market. While it is plausible that rational borrowers are 
concerned about lenders not complying with payment obligations, it is much 
more likely that firms are exploiting the halo effect and drawing in borrowers 
who have an unduly favorable view of the lender. 
5. Advertising About The Appropriate Age To Take Out a Reverse Mortgage 
Advertisements that depict younger borrowers parallel the trend of younger 
borrowers taking out loans. From 1990 to around 2010, the average age of a 
reverse mortgage borrower dropped by almost 5 years,183 and the number of 
borrowers ages 62–69 more than doubled.184 Advertisements that have pictures 
of younger seniors suggest that reverse mortgage companies are targeting those 
customers because social psychologists suggest that we tend to buy things we see 
other people “like us” buying.185 
The reverse mortgage product, however, is less beneficial and more 
dangerous for younger seniors. Older seniors benefit the most from reverse 
mortgages because the law sets the limit on how much a borrower can borrow 
based on age, and the older a borrower is, the more money they can receive.186 
Older seniors also face lower risks from taking out a reverse mortgage because 
they are less likely to “outlive their resources or face unexpected expenses” than 
younger borrowers.187 Younger seniors receive drastically lower payments in 
reverse mortgages because the lender must carry the loan for so much longer into 
the future without payments. In light of the factors suggesting that older seniors 
are better candidates for reverse mortgages, if advertisements are supposed to 
help consumers, these advertisements aimed at younger borrowers are puzzling 
from a rational-choice perspective. 
One explanation for this advertising push is that firms believe borrowers act 
irrationally in this market because they have present-biased preferences. 
Individuals with present-biased preferences “show a particular desire for 
 
 182.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 9. 
 183.  Twomey, supra note 121, at 386 n.146. 
 184.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 10. 
 185.  Jim Hawkins, Selling Art: An Empirical Assessment of Advertising on Fertility Clinics’ Websites, 
88 IND. L.J. 1147, 1169 (2013) (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PERSUASION 140 (2007)). 
 186.  Nelson, supra note 113, at 343 n.44 (“The borrower is not able to borrow up to the entire value 
of the home. HUD limits all payments to a ‘principal limit,’ that is based on a calculation using a table of 
‘principal limit factors’ such as the borrower’s age and the interest rate.”). 
 187.  CFPB 2015 REPORT, supra note 140, at 10; see also CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 8 
(“By tapping their home equity early, these borrowers may find themselves without the financial 
resources to finance a future move—whether due to health or other reasons.”). 
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immediate consumption” and exhibit “dynamically inconsistent time 
preferences.”188 Relatively younger borrowers who opt for smaller loan amounts 
immediately as opposed to higher loan amounts in the future reflect present-
biased preferences.189 Similarly, reverse mortgage borrowers who opt to receive 
all of their loan proceeds in a lump sum at the start of the transaction exhibit 
present-biased preferences.190 In the current market, these younger borrowers 
are especially likely to take their proceeds as a lump sum upfront,191 and the fact 
that firms are targeting these exact customers suggests behavioral market failure. 
Absent a rational-choice explanation for why younger borrowers would pursue 
reverse mortgages, the behavioral story has more explanatory power, and it 
appears that at least some borrowers are making irrational decisions. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
In the reverse mortgage market, it appears that firms believe consumers are 
making irrational decisions because they advertise information that would appeal 
only to irrational borrowers and not to rational ones. Policymakers can use 
advertisements to create new regulations that address the biases identified 
through advertisements. For instance, because there is evidence that borrowers 
neglect the overall cost of the transaction because of limited-attention problems, 
regulators can require that all advertisements display interest rate and fee 
information prominently, instead of in fine print, anytime reverse mortgage 
companies advertise these loans. Similarly, policymakers can combat over-
optimism about the likelihood of foreclosure by developing disclosures that 
communicate the probability that a borrower will default and face foreclosure. 
But, these suggestions are merely preliminary thoughts on optimal 
regulations. More importantly, they are just one illustration of a new approach 
for detecting behavioral market failure. Beyond considering specific regulations 
for reverse mortgages, the approach demonstrated here could have wide 
application in a variety of contexts, especially for credit products or other 
products that involve complex decisions or preferences over time. By using 
existing empirical studies of advertising or through creating new empirical work 
that studies advertising in specific markets, researchers can detect consumers’ 
   
 
 188.  Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Present-biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing, 2 
AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 193, 195 (2010). 
 189.  Latona, supra note 93, at 427 (“Prospective borrowers are more likely to be in their sixties at 
origination than in the past, have more substantial existing mortgage debt than older borrowers, and take 
more cash up front.”). 
 190.  Stark et al., supra note 83, at 306 (“Under the line of credit plan, the borrower will receive the 
mortgage proceeds in unscheduled payments or in installments, at times and in amounts of the borrower’s 
choosing, until the line of credit is exhausted. This is the most popular plan chosen by borrowers, with 
75% of borrowers selecting this option, perhaps because under it the borrower would have immediate 
access to a large sum rather than continuing small payments across time.”). 
 191.  CFPB 2012 REPORT, supra note 86, at 8. 
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behavioral biases across numerous markets and suggest regulatory interventions 
to help these markets operate more efficiently.192 
 
 
 192.  For another example of this method applied to payday lending advertisements, see Hawkins, 
supra note 82. 
